Societies invest in scientific studies to better understand the world and attempt to harness such improved understanding to address pressing societal problems. Published research, however, can be useful for theory or application only if it is credible. In science, a credible finding is one that has repeatedly survived risky falsification attempts. However, state-of-the-art meta-analytic approaches cannot determine the credibility of an effect because they do not account for the extent to which each included study has survived such attempted falsification. To overcome this problem, we outline a unified framework for estimating the credibility of published research by examining four fundamental falsifiability-related dimensions: (a) transparency of the methods and data, (b) reproducibility of the results when the same data-processing and analytic decisions are reapplied, (c) robustness of the results to different data-processing and analytic decisions, and (d) replicability of the effect. This framework includes a standardized workflow in which the degree to which a finding has survived scrutiny is quantified along these four facets of credibility. The framework is demonstrated by applying it to published replications in the psychology literature. Finally, we outline a Web implementation of the framework and conclude by encouraging the community of researchers to contribute to the development and crowdsourcing of this platform.

Finkel, Eastwick, and Reis (2016; FER2016) argued the post-2011 methodological reform movement has focused narrowly on replicability, neglecting other essential goals of research. We agree multiple scientific goals are essential, but argue, however, a more fine-grained language, conceptualization, and approach to replication is needed to accomplish these goals. Replication is the general empirical mechanism for testing and falsifying theory. Sufficiently methodologically similar replications, also known as direct replications, test the basic existence of phenomena and ensure cumulative progress is possible a priori. In contrast, increasingly methodologically dissimilar replications, also known as conceptual replications, test the relevance of auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., manipulation and measurement issues, contextual factors) required to productively investigate validity and generalizability. Without prioritizing replicability, a field is not empirically falsifiable. We also disagree with FER2016’s position that “bigger samples are generally better, but... that very large samples could have the downside of commandeering resources that would have been better invested in other studies” (abstract). We identify problematic assumptions involved in FER2016’s modifications of our original research-economic model, and present an improved model that quantifies when (and whether) it is reasonable to worry that increasing statistical power will engender potential trade-offs. Sufficiently powering studies (i.e., 80%) maximizes both research efficiency and confidence in the literature (research quality). Given that we are in agreement with FER2016 on all key open science points, we are eager to start seeing the accelerated rate of cumulative knowledge development of social psychological phenomena such a sufficiently transparent, powered, and falsifiable approach will generate.

Several researchers recently outlined unacknowledged costs of open science practices, arguing these costs may outweigh benefits and stifle discovery of novel findings. We scrutinize these researchers’ (a) statistical concern that heightened stringency with respect to false-positives will increase false-negatives and (b) metascientific concern that larger samples and executing direct replications engender opportunity costs that will decrease the rate of making novel discoveries. We argue their statistical concern is unwarranted given open science proponents recommend such practices to reduce the inflated Type I error rate from .35 down to .05 and simultaneously call for high-powered research to reduce the inflated Type II error rate. Regarding their metaconcern, we demonstrate that incurring some costs is required to increase the rate (and frequency) of making true discoveries because distinguishing true from false hypotheses requires a low Type I error rate, high statistical power, and independent direct replications. We also examine pragmatic concerns raised regarding adopting open science practices for relationship science (preregistration, open materials, open data, direct replications, sample size); while acknowledging these concerns, we argue they are overstated given available solutions. We conclude benefits of open science practices outweigh costs for both individual researchers and the collective field in the long run, but that short term costs may exist for researchers because of the currently dysfunctional academic incentive structure. Our analysis implies our field’s incentive structure needs to change whereby better alignment exists between researcher’s career interests and the field’s cumulative progress. We delineate recent proposals aimed at such incentive structure realignment.

Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, and Hannon (2002, Study 1) demonstrated a causal link between subjective commitment to a relationship and how people responded to hypothetical betrayals of that relationship. Participants primed to think about their commitment to their partner (high commitment) reacted to the betrayals with reduced exit and neglect responses relative to those primed to think about their independence from their partner (low commitment). The priming manipulation did not affect constructive voice and loyalty responses. Although other studies have demonstrated a correlation between subjective commitment and responses to betrayal, this study provides the only experimental evidence that inducing changes to subjective commitment can causally affect forgiveness responses. This Registered Replication Report (RRR) meta-analytically combines the results of 16 new direct replications of the original study, all of which followed a standardized, vetted, and preregistered protocol. The results showed little effect of the priming manipulation on the forgiveness outcome measures, but it also did not observe an effect of priming on subjective commitment, so the manipulation did not work as it had in the original study. We discuss possible explanations for the discrepancy between the findings from this RRR and the original study.

Correll (2008; Study 2, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 48–59) found that instructions to use or avoid race information decreased the emission of 1/f noise in a weapon identification task (WIT). These results suggested that 1/f noise in racial bias tasks reflected an effortful deliberative process, providing new insights regarding the mechanisms underlying implicit racial biases. Given the potential theoretical and applied importance of understanding the psychological processes underlying implicit racial biases – and in light of the growing demand for independent direct replications of findings to ensure the cumulative nature of our science – we attempted to replicate Correll’s finding in two high-powered studies. Despite considerable effort to closely duplicate all procedural and methodological details of the original study (i.e., same cover story, experimental manipulation, implicit measure task, original stimuli, task instructions, sampling frame, population, and statistical analyses), both replication attempts were unsuccessful in replicating the original finding challenging the theoretical account that 1/f noise in racial bias tasks reflects a deliberative process. However, the emission of 1/f noise did consistently emerge across samples in each of our conditions. Hence, future research is needed to clarify the psychological significance of 1/f noise in racial bias tasks.

Slepian, Masicampo, Toosi, and Ambady (2012, Study 1, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 619–624) found that individuals recalling and writing about a big, meaningful secret judged a pictured hill as steeper than did those who recalled and wrote about a small, inconsequential secret (with estimates unrelated to physical effort unaffected). From an embodied cognition perspective, this result was interpreted as suggesting that important secrets weigh people down. Answering to mounting calls for the crucial need of independent direct replications of published findings to ensure the self-correcting nature of our science, we sought to corroborate Slepian et al.’s finding in two extremely highpowered, preregistered studies that were very faithful to all procedural and methodological details of the original study (i.e., same cover story, study title, manipulation, measures, item order, scale anchors, task instructions, sampling frame, population, and statistical analyses). In both samples, we were unsuccessful in replicating the target finding. Although Slepian et al. reported three other studies supporting the secret burdensomeness phenomenon, we advise that these three other findings need to be independently corroborated before the general phenomenon informs theory or health interventions.

Past research on close relationships has increasingly focused on the assessment of implicit constructs to shed new light on relationship processes. However, virtually nothing is known about the role of such constructs in understanding ongoing affective and behavioral romantic realities and how implicit and explicit relationship constructs interact in the context of daily relationship outcomes. Using a 21-day diary approach, the present research examined the unique and interactive role of implicit partner evaluations and explicit partner perceptions on relationship outcomes (daily relationship quality and positive relationship behaviors enacted toward partner). Results showed that more positive implicit partner evaluations uniquely predicted more positive relationship outcomes during the 21-day diary period, but that this was especially pronounced in individuals who did not explicitly perceive their partner’s attributes in an overly positive manner. Implications for the close relationship literature are discussed.

In their 2015 paper, Thorstenson, Pazda, and Elliot offered evidence from two experiments that perception of colors on the blue–yellow axis was impaired if the participants had watched a sad movie clip, compared to participants who watched clips designed to induce a happy or neutral mood. Subsequently, these authors retracted their article, citing a mistake in their statistical analyses and a problem with the data in one of their experiments. Here, we discuss a number of other methodological problems with Thorstenson et al.’s experimental design, and also demonstrate that the problems with the data go beyond what these authors reported. We conclude that repeating one of the two experiments, with the minor revisions proposed by Thorstenson et al., will not be sufficient to address the problems with this work.