Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, and Hannon (2002, Study 1) demonstrated a causal link between subjective commitment to a relationship and how people responded to hypothetical betrayals of that relationship. Participants primed to think about their commitment to their partner (high commitment) reacted to the betrayals with reduced exit and neglect responses relative to those primed to think about their independence from their partner (low commitment). The priming manipulation did not affect constructive voice and loyalty responses. Although other studies have demonstrated a correlation between subjective commitment and responses to betrayal, this study provides the only experimental evidence that inducing changes to subjective commitment can causally affect forgiveness responses. This Registered Replication Report (RRR) meta-analytically combines the results of 16 new direct replications of the original study, all of which followed a standardized, vetted, and preregistered protocol. The results showed little effect of the priming manipulation on the forgiveness outcome measures, but it also did not observe an effect of priming on subjective commitment, so the manipulation did not work as it had in the original study. We discuss possible explanations for the discrepancy between the findings from this RRR and the original study.

Finkel, Eastwick, and Reis (2016; FER2016) argued the post-2011 methodological reform movement has focused narrowly on replicability, neglecting other essential goals of research. We agree multiple scientific goals are essential, but argue, however, a more fine-grained language, conceptualization, and approach to replication is needed to accomplish these goals. Replication is the general empirical mechanism for testing and falsifying theory. Sufficiently methodologically similar replications, also known as direct replications, test the basic existence of phenomena and ensure cumulative progress is possible a priori. In contrast, increasingly methodologically dissimilar replications, also known as conceptual replications, test the relevance of auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., manipulation and measurement issues, contextual factors) required to productively investigate validity and generalizability. Without prioritizing replicability, a field is not empirically falsifiable. We also disagree with FER2016’s position that “bigger samples are generally better, but... that very large samples could have the downside of commandeering resources that would have been better invested in other studies” (abstract). We identify problematic assumptions involved in FER2016’s modifications of our original research-economic model, and present an improved model that quantifies when (and whether) it is reasonable to worry that increasing statistical power will engender potential trade-offs. Sufficiently powering studies (i.e., 80%) maximizes both research efficiency and confidence in the literature (research quality). Given that we are in agreement with FER2016 on all key open science points, we are eager to start seeing the accelerated rate of cumulative knowledge development of social psychological phenomena such a sufficiently transparent, powered, and falsifiable approach will generate.

Slepian, Masicampo, Toosi, and Ambady (2012, Study 1, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 141, 619–624) found that individuals recalling and writing about a big, meaningful secret judged a pictured hill as steeper than did those who recalled and wrote about a small, inconsequential secret (with estimates unrelated to physical effort unaffected). From an embodied cognition perspective, this result was interpreted as suggesting that important secrets weigh people down. Answering to mounting calls for the crucial need of independent direct replications of published findings to ensure the self-correcting nature of our science, we sought to corroborate Slepian et al.’s finding in two extremely highpowered, preregistered studies that were very faithful to all procedural and methodological details of the original study (i.e., same cover story, study title, manipulation, measures, item order, scale anchors, task instructions, sampling frame, population, and statistical analyses). In both samples, we were unsuccessful in replicating the target finding. Although Slepian et al. reported three other studies supporting the secret burdensomeness phenomenon, we advise that these three other findings need to be independently corroborated before the general phenomenon informs theory or health interventions.